What We CAN DO and What We MUST NOT DO against Credential Thieves

Today’s topic is this report by The Register — “Google: Russian credential thieves target NATO, Eastern European military” www.theregister.com/2022/04/01/russian_credential_phishing/?utm_source=daily&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_content=article

People whose accounts are especially important might hopefully be interested in our proposition of repelling phishers with the power of their episodic image memory — “How to Cope with Wily Phishers”

It would be very nice if you could share this information with your connections in defence and other critical sectors who must make every effort to protect their credentials.

By the way, conventional passwords are indeed frighteningly vulnerable to theft. It would be no big surprise, therefore, to see some people tempted to remove the password altogether, since what does not exist obviously can never be stolen.

You MUST NOT consider removing the password from identity assurance platforms, however.

It would only destroy identity security, for a very simple and plain reason which seems to have fallen into a blind spot of those people, that it is impossible to remove an attack surface of a password without removing a defence surface of the password which somehow provides a positive security effect.

An attack surface exists inside a defence surface, not vice versa, as visually examined in this comment — “Attack Surface and Defence Surface Visually Explained”

and “Remove the army and we will have a stronger national defense”

Visit our website — https://www.mnemonicidentitysolutions.com/